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GERMAN HOMESCHOOLERS AS 
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP”: 
EVALUATION UNDER CURRENT  
U.S. ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 
Miki Kawashima Matrician* 
Abstract: Thirty years after the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals and U.S. courts and have not reached 
consensus on a uniform definition for the protected category of “particu-
lar social group.” The lack of consensus has created much confusion and 
inconsistent results for applicants seeking asylum in the United States. 
This Note examines one family’s grant of asylum as a vehicle for analyzing 
the two main approaches to “particular social group” and argues that the 
current treatment of the two standards as mutually exclusive by the BIA 
and the federal courts is inconsistent with the U.N. Guidelines. The Note 
concludes that U.S. jurisprudence on “particular social group” should 
mirror the approach of the U.N. Guidelines, which envisions broader 
protection under that category. 
Introduction 
 On January 26, 2010, U.S. Immigration Judge Lawrence Burman 
granted political asylum to the Romeikes, a German family who fled 
their native country to escape government persecution for homeschool-
ing their children.1 In 2006, Uwe and Hannelore Romeike, concerned 
that the national school curriculum did not comport with their religious 
beliefs as evangelical Christians, withdrew their children from a public 
 
* Miki Kawashima Matrician is Senior Articles Editor for the Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review. The author would like to thank her husband, Jeffrey Matrician, 
and the rest of her family for their encouragement and support. 
1 Homeschooling Family Granted Political Asylum, Home Sch. Legal Def. Ass’n ( Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.hslda.org/hs/international/Germany/201001260.asp. The Homeschool 
Legal Defense Association (HSLDA) is a nonprofit advocacy organization based in the Unit-
ed States whose mission is to advance the right of parents to direct the education of their 
children. The Immigration Court usually issues oral decisions after the hearing, and this case 
is no exception in that regard. Regina Germain, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical 
Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure 127−28, 145 (4th ed. 2005); see Tristana Moore, 
Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses Yearning to Homeschool, Time, Mar. 8, 2010, at 
47. 
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school in Bissengen, Germany and began educating them at home.2 
They considered the public school curriculum to be contrary to their 
religious beliefs, in part because language and images contained in 
textbooks conflicted with their moral views.3 Concerned that their chil-
dren were being bullied as a result of their religious beliefs, they chose 
to withdraw their children from public school and begin educating 
them at home.4 
 One morning in October 2006, German police officers entered 
the Romeike home without a written court order, forcibly removed the 
Romeike children, and escorted them to public school.5 A few days lat-
er, the police returned to the home but were prevented from taking the 
children by a citizens’ group protesting outside.6 The parents received 
several notices from the school principal and the chief law enforcement 
official in Bissengen ordering them to send their children to school or 
face legal consequences.7 
 From the time they removed their children from public school 
until they left for the United States, the Romeikes accumulated ap-
proximately $10,000 in fines for refusing to send them to school.8 They 
unsuccessfully petitioned the authorities and filed complaints in the 
courts.9 After court decisions in 2006 and 2007 paved the way for the 
German government to take custody of home-schooled children,10 the 
Romeikes fled Germany out of fear of losing their children.11 
 The Romeikes entered the United States as tourists in August 2008 
and filed for asylum within several months of their arrival.12 They suc-
cessfully persuaded the immigration court in Memphis, Tennessee to 
                                                                                                                      
2 German Family Seeks U.S. Asylum to Homeschool Kids, Fox News (Mar. 31, 2009), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,511825,00.html; see Moore, supra note 1. 
3 See id. 
4 See Moore, supra note 1. 
5 Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Brief in Support of Asylum or Withholding of Removal at 
6, In re Romeike, File No. A087–368-[redacted], Exec. Off. Immigr. Rev., Immigr. Ct. 
(Dep’t of Justice 2009), available at http://www.hslda.org/hs/international/Germany/ 
RomeikeBrief.pdf [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Travis Loller, German Homeschoolers Granted Political Asylum, Boston Globe ( Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/2010/01/26/german_home 
schoolers_granted_political_asylum/. 
9 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at 6. 
10 See Moore, supra note 1; Loller, supra note 8; Homeschooling Family Granted Political 
Asylum, supra note 1. 
11 See Moore, supra note 1; Loller, supra note 8; Homeschooling Family Granted Political 
Asylum, supra note 1. 
12 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at 7. 
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grant asylum on the grounds that the German government persecuted 
the family and violated their basic human rights.13 The court’s decision 
was the first grant of political asylum for persecution based on violation 
of compulsory education laws.14 
 In light of the U.S. government’s appeal of the immigration 
court’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),15 this 
Note examines the current standard for grant of asylum on the basis of 
the protected ground of “particular social group.”16 Part I of this Note 
describes the compulsory education law in Germany under which the 
Romeikes claim persecution, explores the practice of homeschooling in 
Germany, and provides a brief procedural overview for gaining “refu-
gee” status in the United States. Part II discusses two distinct ap-
proaches adopted by the BIA and federal circuit courts of appeal in 
defining “particular social group.” Part III applies those approaches to 
the Romeike case and identifies inconsistent applications in the various 
circuits and advocates for a uniform standard to comport with the aims 
of international law. This Note argues that, on appeal, the BIA should 
find that all German homeschoolers comprise a “particular social 
group,” regardless of whether the Romeike family successfully estab-
lished a claim of “well-founded fear of persecution.” 
I. Background 
A. The German Education Law Regime Prohibits Homeschooling 
 The unfavorable treatment of homeschoolers in Germany is not a 
unique phenomenon; indeed, there is a robust debate in the United 
States and elsewhere regarding the validity of homeschooling as a 
means of education.17 For instance, in February 2008 the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in Los Angeles handed down a surprising deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting ho-
meschooling for children between the ages of six and eighteen unless 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Homeschooling Family Granted Political Asylum, supra note 1. 
14 See Moore, supra note 1. 
15 Telephone interview with Michael Donnelly, Staff Att’y, HSLDA (Mar. 12, 2010). 
16 At the time of this writing, the BIA had not yet issued a decision in the case. Id. 
17 See Aaron T. Martin, Homeschooling in Germany and the United States, 27 Ariz. J. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 1, 23−30 (2010); Amanda Petrie, Home Education in Europe and the Implementa-
tion of Changes to the Law, 47 Int’l Rev. Educ., 477, 479–80 (2001). 
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their parents possess teaching credentials.18 Within six months, how-
ever, the same court reversed, holding that as long as parents declare 
their home to be a private school, they may teach their children even 
without teaching credentials.19 
 Moreover, there is a movement to end homeschooling in United 
Nations member countries on the theory that a child’s right to educa-
tion may be vindicated only by compulsory education in traditional 
schools outside the home.20 By the same token, there is also a move-
ment to recognize the right of parents to choose the appropriate form 
of schooling for their children.21 The issue has also concerned U.S. po-
licymakers; the Georgia and Tennessee state legislatures have passed 
resolutions expressing disapproval of the German compulsory educa-
tion laws.22 
 In Germany, compulsory education laws require that children not 
only receive formal education from ages six or seven for a period of 
nine years, they also require all children to attend either a public school 
or state-approved private school.23 In addition, German law generally 
does not recognize correspondence education for children living within 
Germany.24 Before World War II, the state recognized homeschooling as 
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 83–84 (Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Kristin Klober-
danz, A Homeschooling Win in California, Time, Aug. 13, 2008, available at http://www. 
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1832485,00.html. 
19 See In re Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 590 (Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
20 See Martin, supra note 17, at 56; Petrie, supra note 17, at 480. 
21 See e.g., Home Sch. Legal Def. Ass’n, http://www.hslda.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) 
(American homeschooling organization that advocates for parents’ freedom of choice over 
the direction of their children’s education); Netzwerk Bildungsfreiheit, http://www. 
netzwerk-bildungsfreiheit.de (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (a German lobbying organization 
advancing educational freedom in Germany and providing support for homeschooling fami-
lies). 
22 See H.R. 850, 149th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2009), available at http://www.legis. 
state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb850.pdf [hereinafter Georgia Resolution]; H.R. 87, 106th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009), available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/106/ 
Bill/HR0087.pdf [hereinafter Tennessee Resolution]; see also Martin, supra note 17, at 1, 
30−31 (noting support for homeschooling movement on the federal and state level). 
23 See Thomas Spiegler, Home Education in Germany: An Overview of the Contemporary Sit-
uation, 17 Evaluation & Res. in Educ. 179, 180 (2003). By comparison, in the United 
States, although the education of children is compulsory under the laws of every state, 
parents are not required to send their children to a state-approved school. See Marilyn 
Grady et al., Compulsory Education: A Policy Analysis 15 (Apr. 25, 1994), available 
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377556.pdf. Compulsory education statutes differ 
state by state and impose varying minimum and maximum ages. Id. Courts have recog-
nized parents’ rights to direct their children’s upbringing under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 8. 
24 Id. Correspondence education for children living abroad is accepted. Id. Correspon-
dence education, or distance learning, is a method of providing education for students who 
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a valid exception to laws mandating compulsory education.25 In 1938, 
however, those exceptions were eliminated, and violations of compul-
sory education laws triggered criminal penalties.26 
 Such violations constitute an civil offense in the first instance, and 
can result in a fine of several thousand Euros for subsequent viola-
tions.27 Continued contravention may incur forcible enforcement, and 
other significant penalties.28 In extreme cases, courts may revoke cus-
tody of the children and even imprison the parents for up to six 
months.29 Alternatively, courts may impose fines that accrue daily for as 
many as 180 days.30 
 In 2003, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, its highest court, 
reaffirmed the government’s authority to compel attendance in state-
run schools and held that the state’s interest in ensuring access to ade-
quate education outweighed the parents’ interest in choosing how to 
educate their children.31 The court recognized an impracticability ex-
emption for children whose parents’ occupations required extensive 
travel.32 It did not, however, create an exemption for homeschooling 
on the basis of religion or conscience.33 
B. Homeschooling Movement 
 Notwithstanding the threat of punishment, the parents of ap-
proximately 500 German children choose to teach their children at 
home.34 Teaching children outside of the public school setting is com-
monly known as “homeschooling,” but many parents join together in 
“learning groups” in a place other than a home to educate their chil-
                                                                                                                      
receive lessons by mail or internet. Id. Students typically return their assignments to their 
instructors for evaluation and comment. See Correspondence Education Definition, Encyclopae-
dia Brittanica.com, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/138674/correspondence- 
education (last visited Apr. 17, 2011). 
25 See Martin, supra note 17, at 7−8. 
26 See id. at 8. For instance, in one case a father who homeschooled his children for re-
ligious reasons faced a five-day prison sentence and the loss of child custody. Id. 
27 See Spiegler, supra note 23, at 180–81. 
28 See id at 181. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See Martin, supra note 17, at 19, 22; Homeschooling Family Granted Political Asylum, su-
pra note 1. 
32 See Homeschooling Family Granted Political Asylum, supra note 1. 
33 See id. 
34 Spiegler, supra note 23, at 179. 
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dren.35 Some parents even opt to join homeschooling organizations for 
support, to exchange ideas, and to find legal representation.36 
 German parents have chosen to homeschool for a variety of rea-
sons, including religious concerns or because a child’s medical condi-
tion precludes conventional schooling.37 Regardless of the impetus for 
the decision, homeschooling parents generally share one outlook: that 
they have the right to direct their child’s education, tailored to the indi-
vidual needs and abilities of the child.38 They believe this is consistent 
with internationally accepted principles of human rights.39 The Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right 
to education[;]” “elementary education shall be compulsory[;]” and, 
“parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children.”40 Furthermore, Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recog-
nizes: 
[T]he liberty of parents . . . to choose for their children 
schools, other than those established by the public authorities, 
which conform to such minimum educational standards as 
may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity 
with their own convictions.41 
That right is also recognized by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which states that “the State shall respect the right of parents to 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Petrie, supra note 17, at 479; Spiegler, supra note 23, at 184. 
36 See id. For instance, Stuttgart Area Home Schoolers maintains a website that pro-
vides resources for curriculum providers, educational requirements, and social gatherings. 
Stuttgart Area Home Schoolers, http://www.stuttgarthomeschoolers.com (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2011). 
37 See Spiegler, supra note 23, at 182, 183. The decision to homeschool is often moti-
vated by religious beliefs, but not always. See Petrie, supra note 17, at 479–80. Parents might 
have any number of reasons for choosing homeschooling, including a child’s specialized 
needs, practical reasons that hinder a child’s attendance, or philosophical outlook, among 
others. See Martin, supra note 17, at 7. 
38 See Spiegler, supra note 23, at 183. 
39 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, art. 13(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention for Human Rights]. 
40 Petrie, supra note 17, at 480 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra 
note 39, art. 5). 
41 ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 13, ¶ 3. 
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ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own relig-
ions and philosophical convictions.”42 
 In reference to these rights of parents, and relying specifically on 
the ICESCR, the U.N. Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Coun-
cil of the General Assembly has urged the German government to re-
spect a parent’s choice for his or her children.43 The report stated that 
“education may not be reduced to mere school attendance,” noted that 
“[d]istance learning methods and home schooling represent valid op-
tions,” and urged states to refrain from restricting “forms of education 
that do not require attendance at a school.”44 
 German education law, diverging from international conventions, 
prioritizes the interest of the state in requiring attendance at public 
schools, with narrow exceptions.45 Having received penalties and 
threats from the German authorities, the Romeikes feared losing cus-
tody of their children.46 Ultimately, this fear led them to flee Germany 
and seek asylum in the United States.47 
II. Discussion 
 As previously discussed, to successfully obtain asylum in the United 
States, a refugee must prove that, on account of48 at least one of five 
protected grounds—race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group—he or she either suffered 
persecution, or has a well-founded fear49 of future persecution.50 In the 
                                                                                                                      
 
42 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 39, art. 2. 
43 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 
of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/29/Add.3 
(Feb. 21, 2006) (prepared by Vernor Munoz) [hereinafter Report by U.N. Rapporteur]; 
Petrie, supra note 17, at 480. 
44 See Report by U.N. Rapporteur, supra note 43, ¶ 62. Some countries have confused 
the right of a child to education with a right to education in a public, state-approved 
school. See Petrie, supra note 17, at 480. 
45 See Martin, supra note 17, at 10; see also Petrie, supra note 17, at 480. 
46 See Moore, supra note 1; Loller, supra note 8. 
47 See Moore, supra note 1; Loller, supra note 8. 
48 An applicant must show that the past persecution or fear of future persecution was 
“on account of” one of the protected grounds. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009). Courts have interpreted the phrase to signify that a 
“nexus” must exist between the persecution and the protected grounds. See Deborah E. 
Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States 268 (3d ed. 1999). 
49 Under the INA, the applicant can either establish a well-founded fear of future per-
secution upon returning to his or her home country to satisfy that prong, or show past 
persecution. See Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook 347, 360 (10th ed. 2006). 
In INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, the Supreme Court ruled that applicants are required to establish 
that “persecution is a reasonable possibility” to satisfy the burden of proof for “a well-
446 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:439 
Romeike case, Immigration Judge Burman found that the family had a 
“well-founded fear of persecution” on account of membership in the 
“particular social group” of homeschoolers.51 
A. Seeking Asylum in the United States—Procedural Overview 
 Upon arriving in the United States, the Romeikes sought safe ha-
ven as refugees fleeing persecution.52 The process begins with an appli-
cation to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, to be filed 
within one year of arrival in the United States.53 Asylum officers process 
asylum applications, hold “non-adversarial” interviews and make de-
terminations as to the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.54 The officer 
may consider the applicant’s testimony, information presented at the 
                                                                                                                      
founded fear.” See 480 U.S. 421, 431, 449 (1987). According to the Court, a fifty percent 
chance satisfies the requirement, but even a ten percent chance could establish “well-
founded fear.” See id. at 431, 440. 
50 INA § 1101(a)(42). The term “persecution” is not defined in U.S. law or in the 1951 
Convention. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Proc-
ess and Policy 860 (6th ed. 2008); see United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N. Convention]; 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]. The drafters of the Convention declined 
to adopt a comprehensive list of all forms of persecution, instead implementing a framework 
that could be adapted to changing conditions. See Anker, supra note 48, at 173. The U.N. 
Handbook provides general guidance, stating that “a threat to life or freedom” on account of 
one of five protected grounds constitutes persecution. United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Status Under the 1951 Conven-
tion and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 
(1979) [hereinafter U.N. Handbook]. Some prejudicial actions or threats may amount to 
persecution, depending on the nature and seriousness of the acts. See id. ¶¶ 52, 54–55. The 
Basic Law Manual, issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (now DHS), in-
structs asylum officers that basic human rights protected by international law should be the 
standard for persecution. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., Basic 
Law Manual 20 (1994). 
51 Homeschooling Family Granted Political Asylum, supra note 1. 
52 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at 7; Moore, supra note 1. 
53 See INA § 208(a)(2)(B). Applications by refugees may be divided into three catego-
ries: affirmative applications, defensive applications, and expedited removal. Aleinikoff, 
supra note 50, at 849–50. Affirmative asylum applications are those filed by applicants who 
are not in removal proceedings. See id. at 850. Defensive asylum applications are cases filed 
by applicants whose removal proceedings are underway and require a higher burden of 
proof. See id. at 851; Anker, supra note 48, at 17. Expedited removal procedures apply to 
applicants who enter the United States without an inspection, and must first establish a 
“credible fear.” Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 852. After clearing that initial hurdle, those 
cases are treated as defensive applications. See id. The Romeikes filed an affirmative appli-
cation a few months after an inspected entry as tourists. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 
5, at 7. 
54 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.9 (2010); Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 851. 
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interview, and information from the U.S. State Department and “other 
credible sources,” including international organizations.55 Given the 
difficulties of proof in asylum cases, the asylum interview is designed to 
elicit all relevant information, with little limitation on the types of evi-
dence that may be considered.56 
 The asylum officer decides whether the applicant is eligible for 
asylum.57 Officers may deny a grant of asylum either because the officer 
does not believe that the applicant satisfied his or her burden of proof 
in establishing the necessary statutory definition of “refugee,” or be-
cause the officer believes the applicant falls outside of the scope of that 
definition.58 Where the asylum officer feels the applicant failed to ade-
quately establish his or her case, the officer refers the case to the immi-
gration court for a hearing.59 
 An applicant may appeal an unfavorable decision by the immigra-
tion judge to the BIA.60 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) may also appeal a decision by the immigration judge to the 
BIA.61 In the Romeike case, the government has appealed the immigra-
tion judge’s decision in favor of the applicants.62 If the BIA denies the 
appeal, applicants may file a further appeal to the federal Court of Ap-
peals in the circuit in which the case originated.63 A circuit court is re-
quired to afford great deference to the BIA’s findings of fact and may 
reverse a BIA decision only if it finds that the BIA committed legal er-
ror or abused its discretion.64 Generally, when a court of appeals re-
                                                                                                                      
55 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.9(e), 1208.11, 1208.12. 
56 See Anker, supra note 48, at 88. 
57 See id. Withholding of deportation is unlike an affirmative grant of asylum; it is a 
mandatory form of relief, and the Attorney General may not return the applicant to his or 
her home country. An order to withhold deportation, however, is not the same as a grant 
of permanent residence. See id. 
58 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adju-
dication and Proposals for Reform 13 (2009). 
59 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(c)(1). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 Telephone interview with Michael Donnelly, supra note 15; see also Moore, supra note 
1. 
63 See INA § 242(a)(1); Ramji-Nogales, supra note 58, at 14; Thomas Alexander Al-
einikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of “Membership 
of a Particular Social Group,” in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s 
Global Consultations on International Protection 263, 275 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 
2003). 
64 Ramji-Nogales, supra note 58, at 14. 
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verses a decision of the BIA, it may only remand to the BIA and cannot 
grant asylum.65 
B. Sources of U.S. Asylum Law 
 U.S. asylum law derives from international law, particularly the 1951 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Conven-
tion) and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Protocol).66 In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act, 
which aimed to tailor its asylum laws to uphold international treaty obli-
gations under the Protocol.67 The Act also standardized the procedure 
and requirements for granting asylum to refugees, repealed restrictions 
limiting asylum to refugees from certain countries, and extended asy-
lum to people fleeing from “friendly” governments.68 Although Con-
gress intended for the definition of “refugee” to mirror the definition in 
the Protocol, the Protocol is not binding on the BIA or U.S. courts in 
construing legal requirements.69 
 The definition of “refugee” set forth in § 101(a)(42) of the INA is 
identical to the Protocol definition: 
[A]ny person . . . who is unable to or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. 70 
When Congress initially ratified the Protocol, however, it omitted the 
“particular social group” basis, despite modeling the remainder of the 
definition of “refugee” after the Convention and Protocol.71 The Refu-
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. 
66 Germain, supra note 1, at 1. 
67 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37; Germain, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
68 Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups and Political Asylum Eligi-
bility, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 739, 744 (1989). 
69 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–06 (2008); In re Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 
220 (BIA 1985). 
70 See INA § 101(a)(42); U.N. Protocol, supra note 50, art. I(2). Although Congress in-
tended the definition of “refugee” to mirror the definition in the Protocol, the Protocol is 
not binding on the BIA or U.S. courts. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505–06; Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 220. 
71 Graves, supra note 68, at 746–47. 
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gee Act did not introduce “particular social group” as an additional 
ground on which asylum could be granted until 1980.72 
 Congress did not provide guidance on the meaning or the re-
quirements of “particular social group;”73 for this reason, the Supreme 
Court sought guidance in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
on Determining Refugee Status published by the Office of United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (U.N. Handbook), 
which emphasizes conformity with the Protocol.74 Accordingly, immi-
gration judges, the BIA, and federal courts frequently cite to the U.N. 
Handbook in their decisions.75 To supplement the U.N. Handbook, the 
UNHCR issued Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Par-
ticular Social Group,” which provide further guidance on the interpreta-
tion of “particular social group.”76 
C. Defining a “Particular Social Group” 
 Of the five protected categories, “particular social group” may be 
the most difficult to define,77 and neither the Protocol nor Congress 
provide any clear guidance.78 Due to the lack of a clear definition, con-
flicting interpretations of the drafters’ intended purpose have spawned 
confusion on the proper construction of “particular social group.”79 
The competing positions may be divided into two camps.80 
 One view is that Congress intended to meet international human 
rights standards and to adequately respond to humanitarian needs.81 
Proponents of that view cite to the Swedish delegate’s observation at 
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries that “certain refugees have been 
persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups,” which 
led to the addition of the “particular social group” category to the Con-
                                                                                                                      
72 See id. 
73 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 232. 
74 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37. 
75 See id.; Poradisova v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 70, 79–81 (2d Cir. 2005); Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 232. 
76 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: “Membership of a Particular Social Group,” ¶¶ 7, 8, 10, U.N. Doc HCR/GIP/02/02 
(2002) [hereinafter U.N. Guidelines]. 
77 Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 897. 
78 Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 232. 
79 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 265. 
80 See Anker, supra note 48, at 379; Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 266. 
81 See Graves, supra note 68, at 750. 
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vention near the end of the deliberations.82 Some commentators specu-
late that the impetus behind this late addition was to establish an ex-
pansive category to extend protections to those people not covered by 
the other four grounds.83 
 The other competing view derives from a fear that a broad con-
struction of “particular social group” will result in a flood of asylum 
seekers.84 Under this view, limits are necessary to prevent an influx of a 
large number of people fleeing civil war and ethnic strife.85 Another 
theory underpinning this approach is that expanding the category be-
yond that intended by the drafters would effectively impose obligations 
on the signatory states to which they did not consent.86 
 The BIA and courts of appeals have developed general standards 
for interpreting “particular social group” that generally follow two ap-
proaches: one focuses on the immutable characteristics common to the 
group; the other considers external perceptions of the group.87 The 
following case illustrations explore the tests, their application, and their 
ramifications. 
1. The Internally Defined Approach 
a. Immutable Characteristics Test 
 The BIA first introduced this approach in Matter of Acosta.88 To de-
termine the scope of protection, the BIA employed the doctrine of ejus-
dem generis to identify connections between race, religion, nationality, 
and political opinion.89 The BIA identified immutability as the common 
thread between race and nationality.90 In recognition of the fact that 
immutability cannot be a basis for the two other protected categories of 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Aleinikoff, supra note 633, at 266; John Hans Thomas, Seeing Through a Glass, 
Darkly: The Social Context of “Particular Social Groups” in Lwin v. INS, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 799, 
801. 
83 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 266; Graves, supra note 68, at 748. 
84 See Anker, supra note 48, at 379. 
85 See Aleinikoff, supra note 50, at 830; Talia Inlender, The Imperfect Legacy of Gomez v. 
INS: Using Social Perceptions to Adjudicate Social Group Claims, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 681, 684 
(2006). 
86 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 265. 
87 See Anker, supra note 48, at 379; Inlender, supra note 85, at 709; Thomas, supra note 
82, at 804–07. 
88 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233; Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 275. 
89 Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, as the BIA explained, 
holds that “general words used in an enumeration with specific words should be construed 
in a manner consistent with the specific words.” Id. 
90 See id. 
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religion and political opinion, the BIA added a second factor to the 
immutability test, explaining that characteristics which “ought not to be 
required to be changed” are also protected.91 The Acosta definition of 
“particular social group,” as a group sharing “a characteristic that either 
is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to 
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed,” relies on the internal unifying characteristic of group mem-
bers.92 The BIA referred to the U.N. Handbook’s suggestion that “a par-
ticular social group” connotes “persons of similar background, habits, or 
social status” in support of the formulation of its standard.93 Examples 
of such groups are those characterized by gender, clan membership, 
sexual orientation, family, shared past experiences, and “matter[s] of 
conscience.”94 
 The BIA applied the standard to determine whether Acosta was a 
member of a “particular social group” consisting of taxi drivers in San 
Salvador who “refus[ed] to participate in guerrilla-sponsored efforts to 
destabilize the government, such as work-stoppages.”95 The BIA ruled 
that neither being a taxi driver nor refusing to participate in guerrilla-
sponsored activities qualified as immutable characteristics, because the 
members of the group could avoid the threats either by changing their 
jobs or by cooperating in work stoppages.96 In upholding the immigra-
tion judge’s denial of asylum, the BIA noted that, although it would be 
unfortunate for taxi drivers to have to change their jobs or to have to 
cooperate with guerrillas, international law does not guarantee an indi-
vidual’s choice of work.97 
 In Lwin v. INS, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the 
Acosta test for “immutable characteristics,” noting that it best “pre-
serve[d] the concept that refugee status is restricted to ‘individuals who 
are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience 
should not be required, to avoid persecution.’”98 Lwin, a Burmese citi-
zen, was the father of a student dissident who fled the Burmese military 
regime’s crackdown on protests.99 After being interrogated twice by 
Burmese police, he agreed to report any future contact with his son. 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 276. 
92 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233; Anker, supra note 48, at 378. 
93 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233(citing U.N. Handbook, supra note 50, ¶ 77). 
94 See id.; Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 276. 
95 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 234. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. at 213, 234, 236. 
98 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998). 
99 Id. at 507. 
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Ultimately, he refused to do so and his home was searched on three oc-
casions.100 On a visit to see his son in the United States, Lwin filed for 
asylum on grounds of persecution for his membership in a “particular 
social group,” which he defined as parents of student dissidents.101 In 
support, he provided evidence that a parent of another dissident had 
been sentenced to twelve years in prison.102 The court reversed the 
BIA’s denial of asylum, holding that Lwin had established that he was a 
member of the social group comprised of parents of Burmese student 
dissidents who have received punishment by the government because of 
their contact with their dissident children.103 The BIA continues to rely 
on the “immutable characteristics” test as the primary standard by which 
it determines whether an applicant is a member of a “particular social 
group.”104 
 The strength of this internally defined “immutable characteristics” 
approach is that it provides protection for traits that are fundamental to 
human dignity, and civil and human rights.105 A weakness, however, is 
that in the absence of clear guidance, the subjective nature of the in-
quiry of whether characteristics are fundamental to human dignity and 
“ought not be required to be changed” might improperly result in val-
ue judgments rather than legal judgments.106 Moreover, critics have 
argued that the framework denies protection to groups—like students, 
unions, refugee camp workers, or homeless children—who may be per-
secuted for an identity that is widely recognized by society, but that nev-
ertheless lacks a sufficient basis in civil or political rights.107 
b. Voluntary Associational Relationship Test 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals diverged from the BIA’s “im-
mutable characteristics” approach and set forth a different definition of 
“particular social group” in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.108 Although both ap-
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. at 508. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 510, 512. Ultimately, the case was remanded on the ground that Lwin had 
failed to establish that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. See id. at 508. 
104 In re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 956 (BIA 2006) (explaining that the BIA will “continue 
to adhere to the Acosta formulation” after “[h]aving reviewed the range of approaches to 
defining particular social group”). 
105 See Inlender, supra note 85, at 686. 
106 See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233; Inlender, supra note 85, at 693. 
107 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 295; see also Inlender, supra note 85, at 686 (citing 
James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 8 (1991)). 
108 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); Thomas, supra note 82, at 805. 
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proaches focus on immutable characteristics common to the group, the 
Ninth Circuit further narrowed the category by requiring that the 
group result from a “voluntary associational relationship.”109 Constru-
ing the statutory phrase “particular social group,” the court determined 
that the words “particular” and “social” indicate that the term does not 
encompass large demographic segments of the population.110 By re-
quiring that individuals take some affirmative action to affiliate with 
others, the standard excludes those who have chosen not to associate 
with others with similar characteristics.111 
 Applying this standard, the Sanchez-Trujillo court determined that 
young, working class urban males of military age did not constitute a 
“particular social group” because such a definition was impermissibly 
broad.112 In an effort to avoid granting asylum to unacceptably large 
demographic groups, the court cited the lack of cohesiveness and ho-
mogeneity within the group as the basis for denying the group pro-
tected status.113 
 The court used contrasting examples to illustrate the scope of the 
test.114 It posited hypothetically that a group of males taller than six feet 
would fall outside the scope of “particular social group,” despite the 
immutability of a person’s physical features.115 By contrast, the court 
explained that the family unit is a paradigmatic example of a “particu-
lar social group” and emphasized its fundamental affiliational con-
cerns, common interests, and size.116 This comparison, however, re-
vealed potential inconsistencies in the Ninth Circuit’s test, given that 
families are not necessarily voluntary associations.117 
 In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the court retreated from the Sanchez-
Trujillo test, apparently in an effort to resolve the tension between the 
BIA’s Acosta ruling and the voluntary associations test in Sanchez-
                                                                                                                      
109 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; Thomas, supra note 82, at 806. 
110 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
111 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 278 (explaining that classes of gays and lesbians are 
unlikely to be cohesive or display close affiliation among members); Thomas, supra note 82, 
at 807 (giving as an example Nazi persecution of non-religious Jews despite the victims’ lack 
of interest in associating with each other and complete assimilation into German society). 
112 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
113 See id. at 1577; see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010) (re-
manding case where BIA denied asylum and declined to recognize “particular social 
group” consisting of women from Guatemala). 
114 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
115 See id.; Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233. 
116 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
117 See Thomas, supra note 82, at 806. 
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Trujillo.118 Ostensibly, the court combined the Acosta and Sanchez-
Trujillo standards, but it did not provide any guidance for application of 
this new test in future cases.119 Holding that the test is whether one is 
“united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by 
an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or con-
sciences of its members that members either cannot or should not be 
required to change it,” the court determined that Mexican “gay men 
with female sexual identities” qualified as a particular social group.120 
In its application of the new standard, however, the court implicitly 
abandoned the “voluntary association” test it purported to be uphold-
ing, and instead relied solely on Acosta’s “immutable characteristics” 
test.121 
. E
cognizable group exists, rather than on immutable 
ar
court dismissed the merits of Gomez’s claim without considering the 
                                                                                                                     
2 xternally Oriented Social Perceptions Approach 
 In stark contrast to the internally defined “immutable characteris-
tics test,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted 
“particular social group” from an external perspective.122 In Gomez v. 
INS, the court referred to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sanchez-Trujillo, 
but imposed an additional requirement: the persecutor or society in 
general must perceive the common characteristic as recognizable and 
discrete.123 The court’s emphasis on a common characteristic that 
“serves to distinguish [a victim] in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the 
eyes of the outside world in general” departs from precedent.124 De-
spite expressing approval of the Sanchez-Trujillo voluntary associations 
test, the court ultimately ruled based on whether there is an objective 
perception that a 
ch acteristics.125 
 After evaluating whether the attributes of a group comprising El 
Salvadoran women who had been brutalized by guerillas were recog-
nizable and discrete from the perspective of the persecutor, the Gomez 
court denied asylum to a woman who suffered similar abuse.126 The 
 
118 225 F.3d 1084, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2000); see Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 278. 
119 See id. 
120 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093. 
121 See id. at 1093–96. 
122 Thomas, supra note 82, at 807. 
123 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); Thomas, supra note 82, at 807. 
124 Thomas, supra note 82, at 807 (citing Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664). 
125 See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664; Inlender, supra note 85, at 696. 
126 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663–64. 
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group in the social context of El Salvador.127 Despite having announced 
its test as one that evaluates a group based on the perspective of the 
persecutor or that of society in general, the court imposed without ex-
planation a limiting principle, stating that “broadly-based characteris-
tics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with 
membership in a particular social group.”128 Under this new, two-
pronged requirement, asylum was denied.129 
 In spite of the ruling in Gomez, commentators have praised the 
adaptability of the social perceptions approach to evolving social con-
texts, so that a common trait may set a group apart in one particular 
social context, but not in another.130 One commentator argues that 
whereas some characteristics are immutable because people are born 
with them or because of past experience, other changeable characteris-
tics such as conduct, manner of dress, or expression of belief are used 
by persecutors to identify targets.131 Another commentator, while be-
moaning the ruling in Gomez, nevertheless believes that the approach, if 
applied correctly, is actually broader than the immutable characteristics 
approach; under this view, Gomez would give fair opportunity for recog-
nition to groups of people that may not share immutable characteristics 
under the current doctrine and thus would be ineligible for protec-
tion.132 
 In contrast, in Gatimi v. Holder, Judge Richard Posner of the Sev-
enth Circuit was highly critical of the BIA’s use of the social perceptions 
standard.133 Gatimi argued that she was subject to persecution for her 
membership in the Kikuyu tribe in Kenya, which forces women to un-
dergo genital mutilation.134 Reversing the BIA’s denial of asylum, Judge 
Posner stated that the BIA’s approach was illogical, and concluded that: 
If you are a member of a group that has been targeted for as-
sassination or torture or some other mode of persecution, you 
will take pains to avoid being socially visible; and to the extent 
that the members of the target group are successful in re-
                                                                                                                      
127 See Inlender, supra note 85, at 705. 
128 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664; see Inlender, supra note 85, at 701. 
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130 See Aleinikoff, supra note 63, at 300; Inlender, supra note 85, at 697. 
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133 See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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maining invisible, they will not be “seen” by other people in 
the society “as a segment of the population.”135 
Thus, by Judge Posner’s reasoning, the BIA’s reliance on the externally 
defined test of “visibility” resulted in the denial of “particular social 
group” status to women who have not yet suffered genital mutilation 
and, thus, are not visibly distinct from the rest of society.136 Such a re-
sult would contravene the goal of the Convention to protect targeted 
individuals from persecution.137 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite Judge Posner’s criticisms, the social perceptions test could 
be applied in a manner consistent with the humanitarian goals of the 
Convention.138 This result may be achieved if the BIA and the courts 
consider not only whether the common characteristic of the group 
“serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes 
of the outside world in general,” but also the entire social context, by 
hearing evidence such as expert testimony, country conditions reports, 
and media coverage.139 
3. Recent Cases Illustrating the BIA’s Approach 
 In the cases mentioned above, the BIA and the courts applied ei-
ther the internally-defined immutable characteristics approach or the 
externally-oriented social perceptions approach, thereby treating the 
two, effectively, as mutually exclusive standards.140 More recently, how-
ever, the courts and the BIA have issued decisions that discuss both ap-
proaches.141 In Matter of C-A-, the BIA recognized that social perceptions 
are a “relevant factor,” but ultimately relied more heavily on the immu-
table characteristics test.142 Because it concluded that the respondent 
failed both the immutable characteristics and social perceptions test, 
however, the BIA did not address whether the immutable characteristics 
and social perceptions constitute a two-pronged requirement.143 
 
135 See id. at 615. 
136 Id. 
137 See Inlender, supra note 85, at 703. 
138 See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663–64; Inlender, supra note 85, at 708. 
139 See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663–64; Inlender, supra note 85, at 707. 
140 See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 614−16; Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093; Lwin, 144 F.3d at 
512; Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663−64; Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 232. 
141 Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “social visi-
bility” and “particularity” are factors to consider in determining whether a group consti-
tutes a particular social group under the INA); In re S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); C-
A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 956–57. 
142 See C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 956–57. 
143 See id. 
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 Two years later, in Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA rendered a decision ex-
hibiting stronger reliance on the social perceptions test than the immu-
table characteristics test.144 Examining a social group of “Salvadoran 
youths who have resisted gang recruitment,” the BIA briefly mentioned 
that age is a mutable characteristic due to its temporary nature.145 It 
then introduced a new test of “particularity” to be satisfied in addition 
to the social perceptions test.146 The stated purpose of the “particularity 
test” is to limit “particular social group” designation to cases where “the 
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently 
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, 
as a discrete class of persons.”147 
 In a companion case, the BIA held that the “analysis must focus on 
fundamental characteristics and social visibility within the country in 
question.”148 The court declined to address issues of “particularity,” but 
focused instead on “the existence and visibility of the group in the soci-
ety in question.”149 From this line of cases, it remains unclear how the 
two primary tests will be applied in the future.150 
III. Analysis 
A. The United Nations Guidelines 
 The BIA and the courts have relied on the U.N. Handbook for 
guidance in formulating asylum standards.151 That document defines 
“particular social group” as “persons of similar background, habits or 
social status;” moreover, suggesting a focus on internal characteristics 
common to individual members, it notes that claims may overlap with 
other grounds such as race, religion, or nationality.152 The next para-
graph, however, implicates the perspective of the persecutor, noting 
that certain groups may be targeted because of a perceived lack of loy-
                                                                                                                      
144 See S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 587. 
145 See id. at 583 (noting the ages of respondents as 18 and 21 years respectively and 
that they were 16 and 19 years of age at the time of the hearing). 
146 See id. at 584. 
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alty to the government.153 No provision in the U.N. Handbook suggests 
that the approaches are mutually exclusive.154 
 On the contrary, the U.N. Guidelines, issued in 2002, urge the rec-
onciliation of the two standards.155 The U.N. Guidelines affirm both the 
immutable characteristics approach and the social perceptions ap-
proach.156 Referring to the immutable characteristics approach as the 
“protected characteristics approach,” the U.N. Guidelines echo the Acos-
ta standard: “an immutable characteristic may be innate (such as sex or 
ethnicity) or unalterable for other reasons (such as the historical fact of 
a past association, occupation or status).”157 To determine whether a 
group is defined by such a characteristic, the U.N. Guidelines suggest 
reference to “a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchangeable 
because of its historical permanence” or, to “a characteristic or associa-
tion that is so fundamental to human dignity that group members 
should not be compelled to forsake it.”158 Describing the external ap-
proach as the “social perception” test, the U.N. Guidelines look to a 
common characteristic of group members that “makes them a cogniza-
ble group or sets them apart from society at large,” an analysis that “de-
pend[s] on the circumstances of the society in which they exist.”159 
 Upon defining the two approaches, the U.N. Guidelines indicate 
that the two must be reconciled, to prevent gaps in coverage.160 In a 
significant move, they formulate a new, unified standard incorporating 
those two approaches, concluding that: 
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a 
common characteristic other than their risk of being perse-
cuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The charac-
teristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or 
which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the 
exercise of one’s human rights.161 
The new standard would find a “particular social group” in cases where 
the internal characteristic standard would have excluded them, such as 
voluntary behavior, conduct, or expression of belief, which are funda-
                                                                                                                      
153 See id., ¶ 78. 
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mental to a person’s identity but which courts might not have consid-
ered “immutable.”162 Furthermore, that standard would also permit a 
finding of “particular social group” in cases where, under the social 
perceptions standard, an applicant would have been excluded from the 
category for having successfully concealed their identity which would 
otherwise have been a target.163 The U.N. Guidelines suggest that the 
immutable characteristics and social perceptions test do not comprise 
two prongs of a test, both of which must be satisfied.164 Rather, the U.N. 
Guidelines indicate that an asylum seeker merits the protection as a 
member of a “particular social group” upon the satisfaction of one of 
two tests.165 
B. Applying the U.N. Guidelines to the Romeike Case 
 The BIA should not merely mention the U.N. Guidelines; it should 
apply both the immutable characteristics and the social perceptions tests 
to determine whether the Romeikes merit protection as members of a 
“particular social group.”166 In evaluating the family as part of a group 
of German parents who choose to homeschool their children, the BIA 
should assess whether the group shares a common characteristic that 
could be “innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to 
identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.”167 It should 
then thoroughly consider whether that group is perceived as a distinct 
group by German society.168 Under this approach, the Romeikes should 
qualify as a “particular social group” worthy of asylum.169 
 First, the decision to homeschool one’s children is a characteristic 
that can be considered immutable.170 Characteristics that are “so fun-
damental to individual identity or conscience that [they] ought not be 
required to be changed” qualify as an immutable characteristic.171 
Moreover, under the U.N. Guidelines, “human rights norms may help 
identify” such characteristics.172 
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 As “parents who for religious, political, social, academic, or consci-
entious reasons do not send their children to state-approved schools, 
but choose to educate them at home,” the Romeikes should qualify as 
members of a “particular social group.”173 Their beliefs are “so funda-
mental to their identities or consciences that they ought not to be re-
quired to be changed.”174 This view is supported by the recognition in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the Eu-
ropean Convention of a parent’s broad latitude to make decisions af-
fecting his or her child’s education, including conscience-based deci-
sions.175 In light of this broad, international support, the BIA should 
find that homeschoolers comprise a “particular social group.”176 
 Second, German homeschoolers may properly be perceived as a 
group by German society in general;177 indeed, there is ample evidence 
of a broader homeschooling movement throughout Germany.178 Fur-
thermore, the German Constitutional Court affirmed that compulsory 
education laws apply to homeschoolers.179 The court’s description of 
homeschoolers, as “religiously or philosophically motivated ‘parallel 
societies,’” evinces the state’s perception of homeschoolers as a recog-
nizable group.180 
 Moreover, the resolutions passed by American state legislatures 
strongly suggest that in the United States, German homeschoolers have 
already received recognition as a distinct group.181 For example, as pre-
viously mentioned, state legislatures in Georgia and Tennessee have 
passed resolutions urging Germany to allow homeschoolers to deter-
mine their children’s education.182 In order “to prevent the emergence 
of parallel societies based on separate philosophical convictions,” both 
resolutions denounce the policy of the German government against 
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homeschooling.183 The resolution passed by the Georgia legislature 
also refers to the high academic standards achieved by “home educated 
students,” reinforcing the perception of homeschoolers as not merely a 
recognizable group, but as a viable one as well.184 Thus, the Romeikes 
have a strong case for “particular social group” under the social percep-
tions test recognized by the U.N. Guidelines.185 
 The BIA should follow the U.N. Guidelines and accord equal 
weight to both the immutable characteristics and the social perceptions 
tests and find that the Romeikes are members of a “particular social 
group” under either test.186 By considering the Romeikes’ claims in 
light of the U.N. Guidelines, the BIA would fulfill the humanitarian 
vision of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.187 More-
over, the proposed approach would further Congress’ intent underly-
ing the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980—to standardize the pro-
cedure and requirement for “particular social group.”188 
Conclusion 
 The Romeikes made a conscientious choice to homeschool their 
children because the public school curriculum did not comport with 
their religious beliefs. By withdrawing their children from public 
school, they violated German compulsory education laws. They contin-
ued to homeschool their children despite considerable financial penal-
ties, and ultimately fled Germany to avoid losing custody of their chil-
dren. They came to the United States as tourists and sought asylum. 
 The requirements under current INA provisions on asylum per-
taining to “particular social group,” based on the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and further implemented by the Refugee Act 
of 1980, are ill-defined and are the source of much confusion, espe-
cially with regard to the “particular social group” category. The BIA and 
the courts have evaluated “particular social group” under two ap-
proaches that have been applied inconsistently, leading to arbitrary de-
nials of asylum. Commenting on the phenomenon, Judge Posner 
warned that “given the uncertainties in the law, the difficulties in the 
facts, [and] the seemingly arbitrary variance among the immigration 
judges, the court of appeals judges are also going to be falling back on 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Georgia Resolution, supra note 22; Tennessee Resolution, supra note 22. 
184 See Georgia Resolution, supra note 22. 
185 See Report by U.N. Rapporteur, supra note 43, ¶ 62. 
186 See U.N. Guidelines, supra note 76, ¶ 11. 
187 See U.N. Convention, supra note 50, ¶ 62; Inlender, supra note 85, at 701. 
188 See Graves, supra note 68, at 743–44. 
462 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:439 
                                                                                                                     
. . . personal reactions, intuitions, values, and so on. . . . This is sup-
posed to be a uniform body of federal law.”189 
 In the Romeike case, the BIA can and should find that the family is a 
member of a “particular social group” under either the immutable cha-
racteristics or the social perceptions approaches. German homeschool-
ers share characteristics, the validity of which are recognized by inter-
national law, that ought not to be changed. The U.N. Declaration of 
Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the European Convention for Human 
Rights all recognize a parent’s right to choose the appropriate educa-
tional venue for her child. Moreover, homeschoolers in Germany join 
organizations to provide support for each other, exchange ideas, and 
share legal representation. They are perceived as a recognizable group 
by their alleged persecutor, as well as by society at large—in Germany 
and abroad. 
 While some groups constitute a “particular social group” under 
one standard and not the other, the U.N. Guidelines address this dis-
crepancy. In the future, the BIA and the courts must uniformly adopt 
the standard provided by the U.N. Guidelines. Under the guidelines, 
the two standards do not comprise a two-pronged test; they constitute 
two distinct tests, and the satisfaction of one test should lead to a find-
ing of “particular social group.” This approach will realize the vision 
intended by Congress in its enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. In 
formulating a cogent standard, DHS, BIA, and the courts must not be 
blinded by fears of a flood of applicants. They should strive to fulfill the 
humanitarian obligations required by the Convention, to provide a safe 
haven for those in dire straits. 
 
189 Ramji-Nogales, supra note 58, at 79. 
